List of Notes
Türkiye vs. human rights, democracy and the rule of law: a race to the bottom (July 2026)
Should Kyrgyzstan join the Budapest and/or Hanoi Conventions on cybercrime? (June 2026)
Virtual assets and the Budapest Convention (June 2026)
Tajikistan: cooperation on cybercrime (June 2026)
UN AHC: Agony ahead? Alternative protocol proposals? (June 2026)
20th anniversary of the Cybercrime Convention Committee: the story of the T-CY (June 2026)
Hanoi Convention against cybercrime: More reservations (April 2026)
Cybercrime, diversity and resilience in the Pacific: a short visit to Papua New Guinea (March 2026)
The character of the Russian regime (updated February 2026)
Football in the Ice Age (January 2026)
Protecting freedom against billionaire power (January 2026)
Flooding the zone: the authoritarian strategy of epistemic disruption (January 2026)
Submission for 2026 Word of the Year: Accountability! (December 2025)
New Year resolution re AI generated content (December 2025)
USA/Russia alignment against democracy in Europe? (December 2025)
Money laundering: Blacklisting Russia (December 2025)
Türkiye: Use of Bylock evidence is a violation of human rights (European Court of Human Rights) (December 2025)
Hanoi Convention against cybercrime: reservations to human rights provisions? (November 2025)
The character of the Russian regime (November 2025)
The Hanoi Convention against Cybercrime: "signatories" (October 2025)
Russian motivations behind the Hanoi Convention against Cybercrime (JustSecurity, October 2025)
The "Hanoi Convention on Cybercrime": Managing risks (Journal of Cyber Policy, October 2025)
14 July2026
Democracy
Türkiye vs. human rights, democracy and the rule of law: a race to the bottom
Ten years after the attempted coup of 15 July 2016, and following the exclusion of Russia from the Council of Europe in 2022, Türkiye is competing with Azerbaijan for the last place among the 46 members of the organization.
Türkiye’s shift from a flawed democracy (“partly free” in 2015) to an authoritarian regime is reflected in the systematic dismantling of an independent judiciary, the suppression of press freedoms and the targeting of political opponents.
Following the failed coup of 15 July 2016, hundreds of thousand of people were subjected to criminal proceedings (and over 125,000 convicted) for their alleged link to the “Gülen movement” or “FETÖ/PDY” (“Fetullahist Terror Organisation/Parallel State Structure”) as it is termed by the Turkish authorities. More than 4,100 judges and prosecutors have been dismissed or arrested. (See my note regarding “Bylock”.)
The case of Osman Kavala – a philanthropist incarcerated since October 2017 – is representative of arbitrary detention, politically-motivated imprisonment, the targeting of human rights defenders and of the refusal of Türkiye’s regime to comply with decisions of the European Court of Human Rights.
The mayor of Istanbul, Ekrem İmamoğlu, potentially president Erdogan’s main political competitor, was arrested on 19 March 2025, that is, on the same day that his party nominated him to compete for the presidency. He has since been in jail with prosecutors reportedly seeking a jail term of up to 2,430 years.
The degradation of Türkiye’s standards of human rights, democracy and the rule of law is confirmed by several surveys.
.....
A composite indicator for 2025 – consisting of V-DEM’s “liberal democracy index”, the “rule of law” and “voice and accountability” data sets of the World Bank’s “Worldwide Governance Indicators” and the Freedom House scores – shows that from among the currently 46 members of the Council of Europe, Türkiye sits at the bottom in terms of human rights, democracy and the rule of law – almost. Only Azerbaijan fares worse with scores similar to those of Russia that was expelled in 2022.
...
Data for 2026 may show improvements in some States. But that is unlikely to be the case for Türkiye: given the experience of the past ten years since 2016 and with presidential elections on the horizon in 2028, data on human rights, democracy and the rule of law in Türkiye will probably indicate a further degradation with the country risking to turn into a closed autocracy before too long.
[See the full note with sources and a table ranking Council of Europe member States]
13 June 2026
Cybercrime
Should Kyrgyzstan join the Budapest and/or Hanoi Conventions on cybercrime?
Should Kyrgyzstan join the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime? Or the Hanoi Convention? And what about that article 32 that Russia keeps complaining about?
These were some of the questions that we discussed in Bishkek this week in a training course on international law applicable in cyberspace.
I was happy to return to Kyrgyzstan. My previous visit dates back to June 1996 when I came to Bishkek for a regional workshop on corruption and organized crime in Central Asia.
The event this week was organized by Cyber Law International in cooperation with the e-Governance Academy with funding under the European Union's GlobalGateway initiative. Liis Vihul covered the international law part (attribution; counter-measures; human rights) while I discussed the question of cybercrime and electronic evidence.
Participants represented key institutions (ministries of justice, interior, foreign affairs and digitalization; the office of the prosecutor general; the data protection agency; and others).
Kyrgyz authorities expressed strong interest in joining both treaties, the Budapest and Hanoi conventions. A draft law transposing their provisions into domestic law reportedly is in parliament awaiting the first reading.
As expected (Russia!), there was much interest in article 32 of the Budapest Convention on transborder access to data. Explaining this article through different scenarios was fun; and hopefully there is now a better understanding by Kyrgyz authorities of the limited scope but also of the value of that provision.
The approach of reforming domestic law prior to signing international agreements reflects the serious intentions of the government of Kyrgyzstan.
A more detailed analysis of domestic legislation (draft laws and legislation in force, as well as of conditions and safeguards for law enforcement powers) and some capacity building activities would help determine the readiness of Kyrgyzstan to join the Hanoi, and possibly also the Budapest Convention.
12 June 2026
Cybercrime
Virtual assets and the Budapest Convention
Does the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime apply to crypto investigations?
According to a new study, the answer is: largely yes.
On 4 June, the Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY) adopted a mapping study examining how parties are actually using the tools of the Convention in cases related to virtual asset (VA) and virtual asset service providers (VASPs).
What the study found:
▸ The procedural powers of the Convention are widely made use of. A large majority of responding States apply preservation orders (Art. 16–17), production orders (Art. 18) and search and seizure (Art. 19) to obtain KYC/CDD data, transaction histories, wallet addresses and technical metadata from VASPs. Some are also using these tools to seize virtual assets directly.
▸ The Convention is a tool for broader international cooperation. More than half of States can use it as a legal basis for cross-border VASP data requests, and for some it may be the only available treaty basis.
▸ Article 32 on transborder access to data is highly relevant for several parties. Given the blockchain's public nature, Article 32(a) may permit the use of such publicly available data in criminal proceedings.
▸ The 24/7 Network is used by about half of the parties in VASP investigations for rapid preservation requests, coordination and identifying relevant providers in other countries.
▸ The Second Protocol adds options. Where VASPs qualify as "service providers" under Art. 1.c of the Convention, the Protocol's direct cooperation and expedited disclosure tools become available.
The study also maps legal challenges such as unclear VASP locations, fragmented KYC data retention practices, the volatility problem for seized assets, and the tension between fast voluntary channels and the admissibility of evidence.
The report comprises a set of recommendations for follow up.
These findings are most useful for practitioners working on the intersection of cybercrime, financial crime and crypto investigations.
And this exercise is another example of the dynamic and ongoing evolution of the framework of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime.
Well-deserved congratulations to the T-CY Bureau and Jan Kralik for driving this work forward!
10 June 2026
Cybercrime
Tajikistan: cooperation on cybercrime
Working on cybercrime keeps taking me to new and interesting places. This time it is Dushanbe, show-case capital of Tajikistan.
With Cyber Law International and in cooperation with the e-Governance Academy we just delivered a course on international law applicable in cyberspace at Tajikistan’s Agency for Digital Innovation and Technology. The event was funded under the Global Gateway initiative of the European Union.
Liis Vihul covered the international law part (Attribution! Counter-measures! Human rights law!) while I discussed the question of cybercrime and electronic evidence.
Tajikistan has ambitious plans regarding digital transformation. In October 2025, it also signed the United Nations Convention against cybercrime in Hanoi. Implementing that treaty in domestic law and practice is a concrete goal that Tajikistan should pursue.
While some offences related to cybercrime are already defined in the domestic criminal code, procedural powers are largely absent. I underlined that domestic criminal law reforms need to be carried out PRIOR to ratification of the Hanoi Convention. And respecting its human rights and rule of law provisions is a condition for trusted international cooperation.
Accession to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime could be an option to be considered in the future once experience with the Hanoi Convention is available.
6 June 2026
Cybercrime
UN AHC: Agony ahead? Alternative protocol proposals?
In the coming days, the United Nations Ad Hoc Committee on Cybercrime will meet for so-called “informals”. The main purpose is to make progress with the rules of procedure for the future Conference of States Parties (COSP) of the Hanoi Convention. The “formal” meeting in January 2026 had failed because Russia and others insisted on excluding stakeholders from the COSP.
While the AHC is stuck and States are struggling with implementation of the Hanoi Convention, Russia is circulating text of a future protocol.
The text submitted on 3 June by the Permanent Representation of Russia to the UN in Vienna recycles more or less the same proposals that failed to reach agreement between 2022 and 2025:
- Offences related to terrorism and its financing
- Extremism-related offences
- Organizing mass disorders
- Rehabilitation of Nazism, justification of genocide and crimes against peace and humanity
- Unauthorized interference with critical information infrastructure
- Etc.
Coming from Russia, this is rich!
Years of agonizing (and costly) futility may lie ahead …
So perhaps alternative proposals should be tabled. What about something like this:
Article X – Cybercrime-Enabled Election Interference
(1) Establish as criminal offences
- Illegal access to electoral infrastructure
- Interference with electoral infrastructure, data and systems
- Interception of electoral data
- Manipulation of voter data
- Unlawful disclosure of electoral data
- Operating a coordinated disinformation operation with the specific intent to corrupt or undermine an electoral process
(2) Aggravating circumstances:
- the offence was committed by or at the direction of an agent of a foreign State …
Article Y – Direction, Control and Use of Proxy Actors
(1) Establish as criminal offences
- directing, instructing, or commanding another person to commit an offence under the Convention or Protocol
- recruiting or preparing another person for the purpose of committing an offence under the Convention or Protocol;
- financing the activities of a proxy actor to commit or facilitate an offence under the Convention or Protocol;
- making available devices to another person with knowledge that these will be used to commit an offence under the Convention or Protocol;
- acting as an intermediary between a directing party and a proxy actor in furtherance of the commission of an offence under the Convention or Protocol.
(2) Liability of the directing party
Where an offence under the Convention or this Protocol is committed by a proxy actor, the directing party shall be criminally liable as a principal offender for that offence.
(3) Aggravating circumstances
The directing party is an organ, agent or instrumentality of a State, or acts under the effective control of a State …
Just a thought...
20 April 2026
Cybercrime
Hanoi Convention against cybercrime: more reservations
On 17 April 2026, Vietnam became the 3rd State joining the United Nations Hanoi Convention against cybercrime as a party. Like the two other parties so far (Azerbaijan and Qatar) it made a number of reservations.
Unlike the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime that only permits a limited number of specific reservations, UN treaties are fairly open in this respect. I had raised this issue in previous posts:
- In November 2025 in relation to human rights provisions https://lnkd.in/dr7__PfV
- In April 2026 in relation to Qatar’s blanket reservation to child abuse provisions. https://lnkd.in/dr7__PfV
The reservations by Vietnam read as follows:
“1. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam declares that the provisions of the United Nations Convention against Cybercrime are non-self-executing. The implementation of provisions of this Convention shall be in accordance with constitutional principles and substantive law of the Socialist Republic of Viet Nam, on the basis of bilateral or multilateral cooperative agreements with other States and the principle of reciprocity.
2. .....
3. The Socialist Republic of Viet Nam declares that it shall consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition only in its relations with States Parties that also consider this Convention as the legal basis for extradition.”
Although Vietnam ratified this convention, most of its provisions seem not yet available in its domestic law.
Is the intention of the first paragraph for Vietnam to preserve maximum flexibility as to if and when it intends to implement the provisions of the treaty in domestic law and whether – other than for extradition – it intends to use this treaty for cooperation with other parties?
Reservations like these – or those made by Qatar – point to checkered, ambiguous and uneven implementation of the Hanoi Convention that will make cooperation between parties unpredictable.
1 June 2026
Cybercrime
20 years of Cybercrime Convention Committee: what a journey!
On 3 June, I will have the immense pleasure of moderating a special session celebrating the 20th anniversary of the Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY).
The very first meeting of the committee of the parties to the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime was held in March 2006. The 34th plenary takes place from 2 to 4 June 2026 at the Council of Europe. https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/t-cy-plenaries
It is incredible how the framework of the Budapest Convention with the T-CY as its governing body has evolved over 20 years:
- At the time of the first meeting in March 2006, the Convention had 12 parties. And the T-CY had few resources and participants, but already faced attempts by Russia to derail it (“cyberterrorism”).
- Now, in 2026, the Convention has 82 parties and 16 States committed to join. And it remains the “gold standard” for international cooperation on cybercrime.
Over 20 years, the T-CY delivered:
- 4 rounds of assessments of implementation of the Convention. Having States agree to peer reviews is an achievement in itself;
- 14 Guidance Notes, keeping the Convention current without constant need for new protocols – from the notion of computer systems to election interference, ransomware or spontaneous information;
- working groups on transborder access to data, cloud evidence or cyberviolence, and currently on artificial intelligence and on virtual assets;
- the Second Protocol on enhanced cooperation and disclosure of electronic evidence providing criminal justice practitioners with far more effective tools to obtain electronic evidence from other jurisdictions.
It is the dynamic interplay between (a) the common standards of the Convention, (b) follow up and assessments by the T-CY, and (c) capacity building by the Cybercrime Programme Office of the Council of Europe (C-PROC) that is the formula or algorithm of success of this framework.
But none of this would have been possible without people: highly committed professionals from all over the world. Nearly 200 of them will gather in Strasbourg next week for the T-CY.
I will have the honour of engaging with some remarkable individuals who shaped the T-CY as chairs and key advisers over two decades: Pedro Verdelho (Portugal), Betty Shave (USA), Markko Künnapu (Estonia), Cristina Schulman (Romania), Gareth Sansom (Canada) and Marcos Salt (Argentina).
And festivities will not stop there. Many will return to Strasbourg for Octopus 2026 in October to celebrate the 25th anniversary of the Budapest Convention. https://www.coe.int/en/web/cybercrime/octopus-conference-2026
As for me, following my retirement from the Council of Europe in autumn last year, I will briefly relapse; the topic and this community remain addictive!
2 March 2026
Cybercrime
Cybercrime, diversity and resilience in the Pacific: a short visit to Papua New Guinea
In February 2026, I travelled to Papua New Guinea. The purpose was the delivery of a set of courses on cyberlaw and cybercrime, and to help PNG over the line to becoming a party to the Convention on Cybercrime.
PNG has always been an intriguing place to me. In the early 1980s, while studying at Heidelberg University in Germany, I prepared a paper on “ecological anthropology”, on how human culture adapts to its natural environment and the role of rituals in this process. It was based on research that Roy Rappaport had carried out in the highlands of Papua New Guinea.
And now I made it there, finally.
A story of diversity and resilience
Papua New Guinea is an unbelievable story of diversity and resilience over more than 55,000 years:
- It is the most linguistically diverse country ever and by far: its 12 million people speak over 800 languages – about 11% of all languages worldwide. Isolated communities have been scattered over rugged highlands and more than 700 islands, and had thousands of years to develop their own languages and cultures. When also Polynesian people arrived in PNG around 3500 BCE and then European explorers from the 16th century CE onwards (Jorge de Menezes, a Portuguese, got there around 1526 CE), they added further to the linguistic mix. In the 19th century, “Tok Pisin” evolved as a common language for communication between diverse local populations – forced to work on colonial plantations – traders, settlers and German, English and then Australian colonial administrations.
- Diversity extends to the ecology. New Guinea hosts the world's third-largest rainforest and comprises 7% of all biodiversity ...
...........
In the 1960s, Roy Rappoport, using the example of a community in the highlands of PNG, showed how the culture of a society is shaped by its environment. Information and communication technologies are now part of this environment and are shaping culture in Papua New Guinea as elsewhere. Given the resilience of communities here over millennia, they will probably also adapt to these technologies and related challenges in their own diverse ways while, at the same time, being part of a common international framework for cooperation on cybercrime.
20 February 2026
Autocracy, kleptocracy, organized crime, fascism
The character of the Russian regime
Alexander Seger, Updated 20 February 2026
Four years after the start of Russia’s full aggression against Ukraine (launched on 24 February 2022), twelve years after Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the start of its intervention in the Donbas (2014), three years after the US government committed to defend “freedom for Ukraine, freedom everywhere” (February 2023) and two years after Alexei Navalny was murdered in a Russian prison (February 2024), there is no end to the war in sight. And while it was decided in June 2025 to set up a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine at the Council of Europe in order to prosecute those responsible for this serious breach of international law the US administration of Donald Trump not only commenced negotiations with the Russian regime – over the heads of Ukraine and Europe – but granted legitimacy to it by welcoming Russian president Vladimir Putin to Alaska, USA (August 2025). Putin followed up by further intensifying Russian attacks against Ukraine. Many consider that Trump has given Putin a lifeline by engaging with him while withholding support to Ukraine. The European Union, on the other hand, in February 2026 concluded that Russia was “not ready for peace” with “no tangible signs of serious engagement”.
It is unclear what will happen next. In any case, whether considering continued support to Ukraine, negotiations to end the war, or a future security architecture, it is important to understand the character of the Russian political regime[iv] to negotiate and cooperate with or to isolate, contain or defeat.
The character of the regime was laid bare by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Russian regime, as is argued in this essay:
- is an autocracy where a single leader is able to make decisions of catastrophic dimensions;
- is a kleptocracy not only permitting self-enrichment by Vladimir Putin and his ruling elites but also generating enormous resources to fund internal and external actions and ensure the survival of the regime;
- functions in many ways like a criminal organization;
- has the features of fascism.
31 January 2026
Football
Football in the Ice Age
Alexander Seger, Published on Substack, 31 January 2026
It is early morning on a Saturday in Bucharest; freezing cold, some snow. Shortly, I will be playing football on a small pitch with the “Saturday boys”; guys in their 40s, 50s and a few – like me – in their 60s. The weather doesn’t matter.
...
All of this to underline that yes, football is a fantastic sport to bring people together whatever their background, social strata, cultures, countries or religions.
Neither broken bones nor torn ligaments ever stopped me. I have been attached to this sport for over half a century.
But I cannot and will not FOLLOW games of the World Cup 2026 that are played in the USA.
Gianni Infantino handing Donald Trump a “peace price” specifically created to flatter him was so infantile and humiliating, not only for FIFA but for anyone loving this sport.
More than 30% of people identifying as “soccer fans” in the USA reportedly have a Latino/Hispanic background. The prospects of ICE agents using football matches in stadiums, bars or public viewings as honey traps to round up fans, arrest or shoot them is sickening.
Football has a long history. Precursors were already played over 2000 years ago in China, Greece or Rome. And I am sure, those 40+ games that will be played in Canada or Mexico this summer will be fun.
But football is not made for the ICE Age.
19 January 2026
Democracy
Protecting freedom against billionaire power
Alexander Seger, Published on LinkedIn, 19 January 2026
According to OXFAM’s annual survey on inequality “billionaires are over 4,000 times more likely to hold political office than ordinary people.”
Social media play a crucial role in fostering political inequality and the suppression of freedoms:
- “Today, billionaires dominate media and social media companies, which have become more concentrated, with single companies owning large swathes of the media that people consume. Of the world’s 10 largest media and press companies, 7 have billionaire owners.”
- “Governments do not just choose suppression, they can also systematically stigmatize and scapegoat minorities, supported by far-right parties and media platforms that are often owned or heavily funded by the super-rich ...”
It is sort of perverse that national or far-right populists (MAGA and similar populist movements) that claim to speak for the ordinary person are actually doing the job for oligarchs: mobilizing “the ordinary people against the elite” serves to remove democratic accountability and other obstacles to the further enrichment of the ultra-wealthy.
The result: “Billionaire fortunes have grown at a rate three times faster than the previous five years since the election of Donald Trump in November 2024.”
So what now: Government of the oligarchs, by the oligarchs, for the oligarchs – SHALL PERISH from the earth?
1 January 2026
Democracy
Flooding the Zone: the authoritarian strategy of epistemic disruption
Alexander Seger, Published on Substack, 1 January 2026
Abstract:
This paper attempts to provide a better understanding of the strategy of epistemic disruption pursued by national, radical-right and far-right populist movements (collectively, “NAPO”). The argument is that this strategy and the tactic of discourse saturation (“flooding the zone”) contribute to radical uncertainty that makes people willingly submit to authoritarian certainty. This strategy is sustained by an eco-system consisting of aligned media, oligarchs and their corporations, religious alliances, transnational networks and, in particular, by social media and technological platforms optimized for outrage. NAPO actors not only abuse the freedoms offered by democratic frameworks but put democracy in jeopardy. Understanding their strategies and tactics is essential for designing countermeasures and for strengthening democratic resilience, or better: for democratic renewal.
[Read the full article on Substack or PDF]
27 Dec 2025
Democracy
Submission for 2026 Word of the Year: Accountability!
Alexander Seger, Published on LinkedIn 27 December 2025
My submission for the 2026 word of the year is: ACCOUNTABILITY
Current international crises and domestic declines of democracy are due to the fact that political rulers get away with wars of aggression, extra-judicial killings, breaking national and international laws, causing attacks against parliaments, dismantling democratic institutions or enriching themselves and their cronies beyond imagination. In most cases they are evading justice and accountability.
About 20 years ago, I organized an Octopus Conference on corruption and democracy (political finances – conflicts of interest – lobbying – justice) and subsequently edited a publication on this.
In my own chapter, I noted the following:
“Over time, democracy has gone through many transformations and now exists in many variations. However, the basic principles of democracy remain the same, namely, the ‘sovereignty of equal citizens and the accountability of unequal rulers’. In fact, a major concern of all democratic systems since the times of ancient Greece has been to ensure the accountability of rulers, to prevent the abuse of power and with it to prevent and control corruption.”
Some basics: In a democracy, authority and power is delegated by citizens. Those who have been elected to govern must explain and justify their actions. Otherwise power becomes arbitrary and abusive. Accountability is not only provided through elections. Courts, parliaments, oversight bodies and independent media are crucial parts of a system of accountability that holds rulers (and majorities) in check to prevent tyranny and to safeguard fundamental rights and the rule of law.
And international tribunals are designed to hold rulers and other offenders accountable for international crimes.
In short: accountability is crucial for democracy and justice, but also for international peace and the protection of human rights.
And this is why I am submitting “accountability” as my proposal for the 2026 Word of the Year. Or should it be the Word of the Decade or Era?
27 Dec 2025
Artificial intelligence
New Year resolution re AI generated content
Alexander Seger, Published on LinkedIn, 27 December 2025
In 2026, I will unfollow/unsubscribe/ignore or, at a minimum, not “like” or otherwise not boost authors that rely on #AI to produce “their” content (aithors?).
On different platforms, like many of us, I increasingly come across text that appears to be interesting, logical and making sense. But then I don’t buy the argument. Why?
Because AI-generated content has no soul, is synthetic, has the ductus of a machine. The author is not the one signing the post.
And if I don’t trust the source, I don’t trust the content.
Do we need a sort of "No AI - 100% manual" (self-)certification for posts and articles?
PS: Testing this I asked AI to transform some 200 pages of notes that I had on a particular topic into a 5000-word article for publication. The result was beautiful, catchy, logical and polished, with fancy terminology I didn’t even know existed. But it had no credibility, it was not me, and so I scrapped it.
19 Dec 2025
Justice/rule of law
Türkiye: Use of Bylock evidence is a violation of human rights (European Court of Human Rights)
Alexander Seger, Published on substack, 19 December 2025
The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) on 16 December 2025 confirmed that the approach of Turkish courts that anyone could be convicted for membership in an armed terrorist organization on the basis of the mere use of the Bylock messaging application was a breach of the rights against arbitrary prosecution, conviction and punishment and/or fair trial rights.
The decision was made following applications by 2420 Turkish nationals. This reiterates similar decisions of the ECtHR in September 2023 and July 2025.
What this is about
The Government of Türkiye attributed the attempted coup against president Erdogan of 15 July 2016 to the so-called “Gülen Movement” which is termed by the Turkish authorities the armed terrorist organization “Fetullahist Terror Organisation / Parallel State Structure” (Fetullahçı Terör Örgütü / Paralel Devlet Yapılanması) or “FETÖ/PDY”.
Following the failed coup, hundreds of thousand of people were subjected to criminal proceedings (and over 125,000 convicted) for their alleged link to the Gülen Movement. More than 3,200 judges and prosecutors have been dismissed or arrested.
One of the criteria for determining membership in “FETÖ/PDY” was the installation or use of an encrypted messaging application called “Bylock”. Over 100,000 people have been identified, investigated, arrested, detained or convicted because of the fact that they had installed or used Bylock or because their IP address had appeared in Bylock communications. The initial rational for these criminal proceedings seemed to have been provided by a technical report prepared by the Turkish National Intelligence Organization (MIT) that concluded that Bylock was developed by “FETÖ/PDY” and that it was “made available exclusively for members of the FETÖ/PDY armed terrorist organization”. This conclusion has been - and keeps being - repeated over and over again by the government, the judiciary and pro-government media ever since.
In short, anyone having installed or used Bylock was and is considered a member of “FETÖ/PDY”, membership in which incurs a penalty of 5 to 10 years of imprisonment.
6 Dec 2025
Democracy
USA/Russia alignment against democracy in Europe?
Alexander Seger, Published on Substack , 6 December 2025
Following the US/Russia summit in Alaska in August 2025, Russia’s views as to who is topping the hierarchy of threat actors changed:
It is not the USA anymore but the European Union that seems to be considered the main threat. According to Anton Barbashin (chief editor of Riddle) the EU is seen as both dangerous and weak at the same time.
From Russia’s perspective there is, however, a positive trend: the “growing influence of ‘healthy’ political forces”. Moscow is prepared “to facilitate the rise of nationally-oriented politicians who oppose further increases in military spending, aid to Kyiv and sanctions, and who favor the return of Russian gas”. In other words, Russia will continue to support national populist (far-right) movements in Europe.
Comparing this with the National Security Strategy of the US administration unveiled a few days ago, there is a surprisingly large degree of alignment, in particular with regard to how both see the European Union.
The NSS, among other things, describes Europe as weak and at risk of “civilizational erasure”. US policies must, therefore, be “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations”.
Similar to Russia, the US NSS supports far-right movements in Europe: the “growing influence of patriotic European parties … gives cause for great optimism”.
(See also theguardian.com/us-news…)
Democracy in Europe is, therefore, not only under pressure from the East but also from West with not only Russia but also the US backing far-right or national populist movements with an authoritarian agenda.
Interference with democracy in Europe (“FIMI”) may no longer be an issue limited to Russia and similar regimes ...
5 Dec 2025
Money laundering
Money laundering: Blacklisting Russia
Alexander Seger, Published on Substack, 5 December 2025
The European Union, on 3 December 2025, added Russia to its list of high-risk countries with strategic deficiencies in their anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing frameworks (AML/CFT). (EU Press Release)
This will make financial transactions between Russia and European Union member States more complex, since financial institutions will be required to strengthen their due diligence procedures. Financial institutions in some other States may also exercise caution in order to mitigate risks.
Blacklisting also by the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) would enhance global effects. However, while the FATF had suspended Russian membership in March 2023, it has failed so far to put Russia on its NCCT list of non-cooperating countries or territories, reportedly because of resistance by BRICS members China, India and South Africa, among others. (Reuters Russia FATF)
Flashback to July 2002:
In 2002, Russia was on the FATF blacklist and also found non-compliant with Council of Europe anti-money laundering standards. (MONEYVAL Russia reports)
In July that year, I was holding a Council of Europe workshop in Moscow to discuss steps that could be taken by the Russian authorities to address these short-comings and to plan for a multi-year capacity building programme with European Union funding to assist Russia’s efforts against money laundering ....
[Read the full article]
6 Dec 2025
Democracy
USA/Russia alignment against democracy in Europe?
Alexander Seger, Published on Substack , 6 December 2025
Following the US/Russia summit in Alaska in August 2025, Russia’s views as to who is topping the hierarchy of threat actors changed:
It is not the USA anymore but the European Union that seems to be considered the main threat. According to Anton Barbashin (chief editor of Riddle) the EU is seen as both dangerous and weak at the same time. ridl.io/europe-as-the-c…
From Russia’s perspective there is, however, a positive trend: the “growing influence of ‘healthy’ political forces”. Moscow is prepared “to facilitate the rise of nationally-oriented politicians who oppose further increases in military spending, aid to Kyiv and sanctions, and who favor the return of Russian gas”. In other words, Russia will continue to support national populist (far-right) movements in Europe.
Comparing this with the National Security Strategy of the US administration unveiled a few days ago, there is a surprisingly large degree of alignment, in particular with regard to how both see the European Union.
The NSS, among other things, describes Europe as weak and at risk of “civilizational erasure”. US policies must, therefore, be “cultivating resistance to Europe’s current trajectory within European nations”. whitehouse.gov/wp-conte…
Similar to Russia, the US NSS supports far-right movements in Europe: the “growing influence of patriotic European parties … gives cause for great optimism”.
(See also theguardian.com/us-news…)
Democracy in Europe is, therefore, not only under pressure from the East but also from West with not only Russia but also the US backing far-right or national populist movements with an authoritarian agenda.
Interference with democracy in Europe (“FIMI”) may no longer be an issue limited to Russia and similar regimes ...
12 Nov 2025
Cybercrime
Hanoi Convention against cybercrime: reservations to human rights provisions?
Alexander Seger, published on LinkedIn, 12 November 2025
Following the opening for signature of this treaty in #Hanoi, Vietnam on 26 October 2025, the focus will shift to ratification. As I noted before, this will require:
- the adoption of criminal legislation to provide for offences, powers and procedures required by the treaty in domestic law; and
- the deposit with the UN of an instrument of ratification or similar consent to be bound, typically following an action of parliament domestically.
Further to some statements made in Hanoi, a key concern remains: Will States implement and apply the human rights and rule of law safeguards foreseen in the Hanoi Convention? (see my article on “managing risks”).
And this is where reservations and declarations come into focus. When depositing their instrument, States may make declarations and reservations; for example, to reserve the right not apply a certain article.
In terms of the scope of such reservations, there are major differences between United Nations treaties and treaties of the @CouncilofEurope such as the Convention on Cybercrime (#Budapest Convention):
- In COE treaties, the option of reservations is normally restricted to those specifically listed in the treaty. Article 42 of the Budapest Convention is clear in this respect: “No other reservations may be made”.
- UN treaties on the other hand, are permissive. In principle, all sorts of reservations are permitted unless these are inconsistent with the object and purpose of the treaty (see Article 19 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties).
So, for example, could a State, when ratifying the #HanoiConvention, reserve the right not to apply all or parts of Article 6 (Respect for human rights) or of Article 24 (Conditions and safeguards), etc.?
Who decides whether or not such a reservation would be inconsistent with the object and purpose of the treaty?
And here is the problem: there is no effective mechanism to make such a determination:
- The UN Secretary General as the depositary has only an administrative role and records and transmits reservations.
- The Conference of States Parties (COSP) may discuss reservations and may exercise political pressure but cannot impose a determination.
- Most States are likely to reject referring such questions to the International Court of Justice (see reservations to UN treaties on corruption and organized crime).
In practice, each State may decide for itself whether it deems a reservation incompatible with the object and purpose of the treaty (see Article 20 of the Vienna Convention).
Therefore, it will be important that democratic States – and stakeholders – pay attention to reservations and declarations made, and that States voice their objections if necessary.
This is also stipulated in the European Union Council decision permitting EU Member States to sign the Hanoi Convention:
“The human rights conditions and safeguards recognised and provided for in this Convention, including those in Articles 6; 21 paragraph 4; 24; 36; 37 paragraph 15, 40 paragraph 22 are part of its object and purpose and therefore Member States shall not formulate reservations on these articles. Any such reservations by non-EU State Parties to the Convention should be objected as going against the object and purpose of the Convention.”
Other States could follow this example. Even if the legal effect of such objections is limited, States voicing their opposition may then restrict their cooperation with those States making reservations to safeguards.________________
6 Nov 2025
Autocracy, kleptocracy, organized crime, fascism
The character of the Russian regime
Alexander Seger, Published on Substack, 6 November 2025
After almost four years since the start of Russia’s full aggression against Ukraine, more than eleven years since Russia’s annexation of Crimea and the start of its intervention in the Donbas, almost three years since the US government committed to defend “freedom for Ukraine, freedom everywhere”, there is no end to the war in sight. And while it was decided in June 2025 to set up a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine at the Council of Europe in order to prosecute those responsible for this serious breach of international law, the US administration of Donald Trump not only commenced negotiations with the Russian regime – over the heads of Ukraine and Europe – but granted legitimacy to it by welcoming Russian president Vladimir Putin to Alaska, USA, in August 2025. Putin followed up by further intensifying Russian attacks against Ukraine.
It is unclear what will happen next. In any case, whether considering continued support to Ukraine, negotiations to end the war or a future security architecture, it is important to understand the character of the Russian political regime[i] to negotiate and cooperate with or to isolate, contain or defeat.
The character of the regime was laid bare by the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. The Russian regime, as is argued in this essay:
- is an autocracy where a single leader is able to make decisions of catastrophic dimensions;
- is a kleptocracy not only permitting self-enrichment by Vladimir Putin and his ruling elites but also generating enormous resources to fund internal and external actions and ensure the survival of the regime;
- functions in many ways like a criminal organisation;
- has the features of fascism.
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[Read the full article]
24 Oct 2025
Cybercrime
Hanoi Convention against cybercrime: “signatories”?
Alexander Seger, Published on LinkedIn 24 October 2025
This weekend, States are assembling in Hanoi, Vietnam, to sign the United Nations convention against cybercrime. What does “signing” of the Hanoi Convention mean?
Signature basically is a statement of intent following a political decision by a government (the executive).
It does not really have practical or legal consequences. “Signatories” cannot use the treaty as a basis for cooperation.
For that they need to become a “party” to the treaty. In order to become a party, a State typically needs to deposit an instrument of ratification with the United Nations (or otherwise express its consent to be bound).
Ratification in most cases needs to be preceded at the domestic level by an act of parliament permitting the executive to join the treaty. However, that is not (or SHOULD NOT be) sufficient.
The most important and difficult part is that States need to enact domestic legislation to meet the requirements of the treaty. For example, to make the offences listed in the treaty (illegal access, illegal interception etc.) also offences in the domestic penal code, or provide the powers to search a computer, intercept a communication etc. in their domestic criminal procedure code.
Domestic legislation implementing the provisions of the Hanoi Convention will also be crucial to ensure that the human rights and rule of law conditions and safeguards of this treaty are met, in particular with respect to law enforcement powers.
In the case of the Budapest Convention on Cybercrime, we have insisted that States complete their domestic criminal law reforms BEFORE becoming parties. Signatories and States invited to accede have been supported in their legal reforms through capacity building projects of the Cybercrime Programme Office of the Council of Europe (C-PROC). Moreover, the Cybercrime Convention Committee (T-CY)) is assessing actual implementation by Parties. This has been essential for the effectiveness of that treaty.
Given previous examples of UN treaties, however, it is likely that many States will rush into becoming parties to the Hanoi Convention WITHOUT the domestic criminal law provisions necessary to apply it. This would not only render the treaty ineffective but also mean that States violate their treaty obligations, including with respect to human rights and rule of law safeguards.
See also my recent articles:
- Hanoi Convention against cybercrime: managing risks (Chatham House Journal of Cyber Policy)
- Russian motivations behind the Hanoi Convention (Just Security)
Cyberdiplomatie: Warum die Hanoi-Konvention kein Erfolg für Russland ist (Tagesspiegel)
7 Oct 2025
Cybercrime
Russian Motivations Behind the “Hanoi Convention” Against Cybercrime
Alexander Seger, published in JustSecurity, 7 October 2025
Later this month, governments from around the world will be invited to sign a new international treaty: On Oct. 25, in Hanoi, Vietnam, the “United Nations Convention against Cybercrime; Strengthening International Cooperation for Combating Certain Crimes Committed by Means of Information and Communications Technology Systems and for the Sharing of Evidence in Electronic Form of Serious Crimes” is to be opened for signature. The treaty is being branded as the “Hanoi Convention.”
The cause for its bulky official title is Russia. The lengthy name represents a compromise after Russia objected to using the term “cybercrime.” Russia is also the reason why the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in December 2019 decided to launch the process that led to this treaty. Russia had introduced UNGA Resolution A/RES/74/247, which established an “Ad Hoc Committee” tasked with negotiating the draft text of a convention. For Russia, the Hanoi Convention is its “baby”.
This raises a number of questions: Why would Russia, known as a major source of cybercrime, promote an international agreement against cybercrime? Does Russia have reason to be satisfied with the Hanoi Convention resulting from this process? Could this convention be a game changer in the sense that Russia may finally crack down on cybercrime and engage in international cooperation? If not, what is Russia planning to do with this treaty?
With the opening date for signature approaching and implementation by states to follow thereafter, these questions will come again to the forefront. Governments of democratic countries need to remain alert and understand Russia’s motivations behind this new convention.
[Read the full article]
6 Oct 2025
Cybercrime
The ‘Hanoi Convention’ against cybercrime: managing risks
Alexander Seger, Published in Journal of Cyber Policy, 6 October 2025
Abstract:
In October 2025, the new United Nations convention against cybercrime will be opened for signature in Hanoi, Vietnam. This is a major political achievement given that for more than 30 years agreement on such a treaty was not feasible at the level of the United Nations. The primary reason for this delay had been the perception by most democratic countries that such a United Nations treaty would entail major risks to human rights, the rule of law and a free and open internet. The question now is whether such risks have been sufficiently addressed in the final text of the new ‘Hanoi Convention’ and how remaining risks could be managed in the future.
On 24 December 2024, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) formally adopted a new international treaty on cybercrime which is to be opened for signature in Hanoi, Vietnam in October 2025. The official title is rather bulky: ‘United Nations Convention against Cybercrime; Strengthening International Cooperation for Combating Certain Crimes Committed by Means of Information and Communications Technology Systems and for the Sharing of Evidence in Electronic Form of Serious Crimes’. The ‘UNCAC’ acronym is already taken by the UN Convention against Corruption and thus the new treaty will probably be known as the ‘Hanoi Convention’.
Agreement on the text of this treaty is a major political achievement, given the current fractured international context, and an indication that multilateralism still has a chance.
It has taken more than three decades to come to this point. The first reflections on a UN treaty on ‘computer crime’ date back to 1990. But while the Council of Europe moved ahead with soft-law instruments in the 1990s and then with the ‘Budapest Convention’ on Cybercrime in 2001, agreement on a UN treaty was not feasible until 2024.
The primary reason was the perception by most democratic states that the risks caused by such a treaty on this topic at the level of the United Nations would outweigh the benefits. The question now is whether such risks have been sufficiently addressed in the final text of the Hanoi Convention and how remaining risks could be managed in the future.
This question is relevant given that states currently not only make decisions on whether to sign the Hanoi Convention but are now also engaging in the preparation of the rules of procedure of the future Conference of States Parties (COSP), and from 2027 onwards will, in principle, be negotiating an additional protocol to the Hanoi Convention.
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[Read the full article]